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CONTRACTING OUT OF ARTICLE 9
Meredith Jackson*
I. INTRODUCTION
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), 1 Secured
Transactions, governs the rights of parties to secured transactions.2
Article 9 also establishes a scheme that determines the priorities of
claims against personal and fixture property, whether the claimants
are parties to a transaction, such as a secured transaction, or have
claims arising outside of contract.' This priority system is designed
to promote certainty and reduce the costs of commercial
transactions.4
The parties to asecured transaction can agree to modify or waive
many, but not all, of the provisions of Article 9.5 Opting out of
Article 9 entirely, however, could result in the circumvention of the
Article 9 non-waivable rights benefiting debtors, and, in all
probability, would also impact the rights of third parties who might
be acting in reliance on the predictability and certainty of the
Article 9 priority system.6 Parties should proceed with caution when
* Meredith Jackson is the head of the debt finance practice at Irell & Manella LLP in Los
Angeles, California and has extensive experience in structuring and negotiating secured
transactions, leases, financial asset sales and leveraged transactions of all ilks. Ms. Jackson is a
Fellow and Regent of the American College of Commercial Finance Lawyers, a Governor and
past President of the Financial Lawyers Conference, a past Chair of the California State Bar
U.C.C. Committee and a past Chair of the Subcommittee on Secured Lending of the ABA U.C.C.
Committee. Ms. Jackson has taught Secured Transactions as an Adjunct Professor at University
of California, Hastings College of the Law.
1. Unless otherwise noted, references to specific sections of the U.C.C. are references to the
applicable sections of the Official Text. References to U.C.C. section 1-201(37) are references to
the former Official Text. U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1989).
2. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-207 (2001).
3. See id. § 9-322.
4. U.C.C. § 9-101 cmt. (1989) (amended 2001).
5. See U.C.C. § 9-602 cmts. 2-3 (2001).
6. See E. States Life Ins. Co. v. Strauss (In re Crawford), 274 B.R. 798, 806 (B.A.P. 8th
Cir. 2002) (stating that, under Missouri law, section 9-301's "perfection and filing requirements
are for the benefit of third parties").
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entering into contracts that might benefit themselves at the expense
of other stakeholders whose rights would be impaired, or when
constructing contracts to avoid the obligations imposed by Article 9
on parties to secured transactions.
Although contracting out of Article 9 entirely is a perilous
undertaking, parties may be able to structure transactions in such a
way that the fundamental economics more closely resemble another
type of transaction that is outside of the scope of Article 9, such as a
non-Article 9 "true sale" or "true lease."' As discussed in Part II
below, tension in this type of structuring tends to arise when the
parties wish to retain the economic substance of a secured financing.
Transactions structured with this inherent tension may be vulnerable
to recharacterization as secured transactions.
Alternatively, the parties might desire to stay within the scope of
Article 9, but avoid its most burdensome requirements. Unless there
is a legal impediment, parties to secured-transaction contracts can
generally waive their own rights, even if statutorily granted, if not
the rights of others.8 Under Article 9, certain provisions that protect
the rights of debtors cannot be waived,9 and others can only be
waived or modified under specified circumstances."° As discussed
further in Part III of this article, other standards, such as commercial
reasonableness, may govern any agreement to modify these rights.
Finally, parties may wish to contract out of particular rules
under Article 9, and into a different set of rules. Part III of this
article addresses whether parties can change the Article 9 rules
applicable to their transaction by contractually altering the properties
7. See 4 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 30-3, at
14 n.18 (5th ed. 2002) ("A lease involves payment for the temporary possession, use and
enjoyment of goods, with the expectation that the goods will be returned to the owner with some
expected residual interest of value remaining at the end of the lease term. In contrast, a sale
involves an unconditional transfer of absolute title to goods, while a security interest is only an
inchoate interest contingent on default and limited to the remaining secured debt."); see also In
re Grubbs Constr. Co., 319 B.R. 698, 715 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2005) ("The central feature of a true
lease is the reservation of an economically meaningful interest to the lessor at the end of the lease
term."); In re Frady, 141 B.R. 600, 602 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1991) (holding that a rental agreement
constituted a true lease where debtor could terminate agreement at any time with no further
obligation to continue paying rent, but recognizing that "[a] terminable lease with an option to
purchase may be characterized as a 'sale'. .. if the contract obligates the lessor to transfer
ownership for 'nominal consideration').
8. See U.C.C. § 9-602 cmts. 2-4 (2001).
9. Id. § 9-602.
10. See id. §§ 9-602, 9-603, 9-624.
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of the assets serving as collateral.
II. THE PERILS OF ATTEMPTING
TO CONTRACT OUT OF ARTICLE 9 ENTIRELY
By its terms, Article 9 governs any transaction, "regardless of its
form, that creates a security interest in personal property or fixtures
by contract,"'" in addition to agricultural liens, certain sales,
consignments, and certain interests arising under Articles 2, 4, and 5
of the U.C.C.' 2 The applicability of Article 9 is a substance-over-
form test: "[w]hen a security interest is created, [Article 9] applies
regardless of the form of the transaction or the name that parties have
given to it."'3  A security interest is usually created in a contract
between two parties: a debtor, who owes an obligation, and a secured
party, to whom the obligation is owed. 4 The contract generally
provides that the secured party will have rights in certain (or
substantially all) assets of the debtor as collateral, and can monetize
those assets in the event that the debtor fails to repay its obligations.'
5
A secured party that has taken the steps under Article 9 to perfect its
security interest in the assets of the debtor serving as the debtor's
collateral will be entitled to priority over any unsecured creditor with
respect to those assets. A perfected security interest takes priority
over an unperfected security interest, 6 regardless of whether the
unsecured creditor's claim predates the secured claim or arises
later,'7 and regardless of whether the unsecured creditor is aware of
the secured transaction. 8 As a result, the Article 9 priorities often
govern the extent of non-party claimants' recoveries if the
11. Id. § 9-109(a)(1).
12. Id. §§ 9-109 (a)(2)-(6).
13. Id. § 9-109 cmt. 2. See generally U.C.C. § 2-401 (2003) (passing of title to goods); id. §
2-505 (reservation of security interest by bill of lading); id. § 2-711(3) (buyer's security interest
in rejected goods); id. § 2A-508(5) (lessee's right to deduct for damages due to default); U.C.C. §
4-210 (1989) (security interest of collecting bank); U.C.C. § 5-118 (1995) (security interest of
issuer or nominated person under letter of credit).
14. See U.C.C. § 1-201 (1989); see also Brown v. Jenkins, 218 S.E.2d 690, 692 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1975) ("Unless specifically restricted, a security interest may be created by the contractual
agreement of two parties to secure the payment of an obligation by creating rights in one party as
to certain designated collateral.").
15. U.C.C. § 9-607(a) (2001).
16. See, e.g., id. § 9-322(a)(2).
17. Id. § 9-322 cmt. 4, ex. 1.
18. Id.
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obligations are not repaid on the contract terms. Given these
priorities, why would a secured party choose to contract out of the
application of the Article 9 priorities?
Often, business objectives outside of Article 9 drive this
decision. For instance, tax benefits may accrue in a leasing
transaction that make the economic package more attractive. 9 In
addition, bankruptcy planning may play a significant role, since the
rights of an owner whose asset was purchased from or leased to a
debtor in an insolvency are quite different from the rights of a
creditor who has loaned money against that asset.20 Finally, parties
may occasionally wish to structure a transaction as a sale or lease
because restrictive provisions in their other agreements prohibit the
incurrence of additional debt.2 '
Whatever their reasons, parties that intend to contract out of
Article 9, but enter into agreements that have attributes of both
secured financings and other transaction types, may still be subject to
Article 9, because a court analyzing the economic substance of the
transaction may recharacterize it as a disguised financing.22
Conversely, the transaction could ultimately pass muster as a true
lease, true sale or other transaction, but only after a challenge by the
debtor, its trustee in bankruptcy or another creditor whose position
would be improved if the transaction were recharacterized as a
secured financing and the seller or lessor were re-cast as an
unperfected secured party.23 Recharacterization would return the
sold or leased assets to the debtor's estate, where they would be
19. See, e.g., Friedman v. Comm'r, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 1404, 1408 (1993), rev'd on other
grounds, Friedman v. Comm'r, 53 F.3d 523 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding that "computer-leasing
transaction was without economic substance and was entered into solely for the tax benefits").
20. See generally U.C.C. § 9-207 cmt. 6 (2001).
21. See, e.g., Dev. Specialists, Inc. v. Hamilton Bank, N.A. (In re Model Imperial, Inc.), 250
B.R. 776, 781-83 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2000) (finding that debtor had fraudulently booked "sales" to
obtain improper financing after debtor had entered into a loan agreement that restricted its ability
to borrow money to 85% of total receivables and 55% of total inventory).
22. See, e.g., In re Grubbs Constr. Co., 319 B.R. 698, 720 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2005) (holding
that several "leases" governing the purchase of equipment from third-party vendors were
"clearly" security agreements governed by Article 9); Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Dugger
(In re Teel), 9 B.R. 85, 89 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1981) (finding that a "lease was intended as a
security device" and that the lease transaction was a disguised financing subject to Article 9
priority rules). See also WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 7, at 11-12.
23. See, e.g., Cook Sales, Inc. v. Shores (In re Shores), 332 B.R. 31, 39 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
2005) (finding existence of a true lease where lessee had option of terminating the lease at any
time by written notice to lessor and where the useful life of the leased property exceeded the
terms of the lease).
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available to other claimants, thus defeating the parties' objectives. 4
Alternatively, a secured creditor's interest in contracting out of
Article 9 could arise after the fact, such as when the debtor has
defaulted and the secured party, in reviewing its records, realizes that
it has failed to take the necessary steps to perfect and ensure the
priority of its security interest. A secured party with an unperfected
security interest will typically be treated as an unsecured creditor. 5
In such a predicament, the secured party might consider whether the
transaction could pass muster as a sale, lease or other non-Article 9
transaction. In all of these circumstances, the parties, though they
may prefer classification of the transaction as a sale or lease, should
consider simply filing the financing statements and taking the other
steps that will perfect and protect their interests in the event of
recharacterization. Prophylactic perfection may also serve as a
disincentive to other parties to litigate the matter, as a perfected
secured party will still have a priority claim to the assets in question
even if the transaction is recharacterized 6 Structuring a transaction
as a lease or a sale is a process replete with issues for the contracting
parties.
A. Structuring Transactions as Leases
Numerous cases have considered whether particular leases were
in fact disguised financings.27 While the results are not entirely
consistent, the critical factor is usually the "economic substance of
the transaction rather than 'the locus of title, the form of the
transaction or the fact that the transaction is denominated as a
"lease."' "..28  "Courts look [to] the economic reality underlying a
24. See, e.g., In re Marhoefer Packing Co., 674 F.2d 1139, 1143 (7th Cir. 1982).
25. See Va. Nat'l Bank v. Yale Mining Corp. (In re Yale Mining Corp.), 39 BR. 201, 202
(Bankr. W.D. Va. 1984) ("A trustee in bankruptcy takes priority in rights to collateral over a
secured party with an unperfected security interest ... ").
26. Liona Corp. v. PCH Assocs. (In re PCH Assocs.) (PCH I1), 949 F.2d 585, 600 (2d Cir.
1991) (treating priority claim as an equitable mortgage).
27. See Lawrence Ponoroff & Stephen E. Snyder, Commercial Bankruptcy Litigation § 1:6,
at 1-27 (2004); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 7, at 24-25.
28. Liona Corp. v. PCH Assocs. (In re PCH Assocs.) (PCH 1), 804 F.2d 193, 199 (2d Cir.
1986), vacated, 949 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1991) (quoting S. Rep. No. 989, at 64 (1978), as reprinted
in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5850). See also Duke Energy Royal, LLC v. Pillowtex Corp. (In re
Pillowtex, Inc.), 349 F.3d 711, 719 (3d Cir. 2003) (stating that courts must consider the
"economic reality of the transaction" to determine whether to characterize it as a lease or a
secured financing arrangement); Mason v. Heller Fin. Leasing, Inc. (In re JII Liquidating, Inc.),
341 B.R. 256, 268-69 (Bankr. N.D. I11. 2006).
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questioned agreement and not to the labels applied by the parties to
determine the true nature of a transaction. ' 29  Former U.C.C. section
1-201(37)(b) sets forth a series of objective factors for recognizing
when a purported lease is in fact a disguised financing.30 These
factors create "a bright line test whereby, as a matter of law, a
transaction creates a security interest."'3 The analytic difficulty
arises in transactions that do not squarely meet these definitive
criteria. In these cases, where the transaction has attributes of both a
lease and a secured financing, and recharacterization as a secured
transaction is not compelled by the 1-201(37)(b) factors, additional
probing is required to determine whether the transaction more
closely resembles a lease or a security interest.
Failure to meet one of the conditions says only that the
document is not conclusively a security agreement; the
pinball has safely rolled past four holes each marked
security agreement. Evasion of those four holes does not
earn one enough points to become a lease. Finding
economic life beyond the lease term and seeing no nominal
consideration option what should a court do? The court
must then answer whether the lessor retained a reversionary
interest. If there is a meaningful reversionary interest-
29. In re Dena Corp., 312 B.R. 162, 169 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004).
30. The former Official Text of U.C.C. section 1-201(37) provided:
Whether a transaction creates a lease or security interest is determined by the facts
of each case; however, a transaction creates a security interest if the consideration the
lessee is to pay the lessor for the right to possession and use of the goods is an
obligation for the term of the lease not subject to termination by the lessee, and
(a) the original term of the lease is equal to or greater than the remaining economic
life of the goods,
(b) the lessee is bound to renew the lease for the remaining economic life of the
goods or is bound to become the owner of the goods,
(c) the lessee has an option to renew the lease for the remaining economic life of
the goods for no additional consideration or nominal additional consideration upon
compliance with the lease agreement, or
(d) the lessee has an option to become the owner of the goods for no additional
consideration or nominal additional consideration upon compliance with the lease
agreement.
U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1989).
The comment to the Official Text of current U.C.C. section 1-203 provides, "This section
is substantively identical to those portions of former Section 1-201(37) that distinguished 'true'
leases from security interests .... U.C.C. § 1-203 cmt. (2001).
31. PSINet, Inc. v. Cisco Sys. Capital Corp. (In re PSINet, Inc.), 271 B.R. 1, 43 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2001) (quoting In re Owen, 221 B.R. 56, 60 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1998)).
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either an up side right or a down side risk-the parties have
signed a lease, not a security agreement. If not, vice versa.3
Courts have reached varying conclusions on the importance of
different factors in this second step of the true lease analysis. Some
courts have even considered the intent of the parties in conjunction
with the objective economic substance test.3  After a careful
analysis, the court in In re QDS Components, Inc. concluded that, if
the bright line test is not met, the pivotal question is whether there is
"substantial economic life" at the end of the lease term.34 This is a
logical test, but not an easy one to administer. If the lessor prefers to
contract out of Article 9, it may find that its only option is to
restructure the transaction so that it not only satisfies the 1-
201(37)(b) factors, but also passes economic muster as a true lease.
That objective may be at odds with the parties' tax or other economic
goals.
An additional danger can arise when a foreign lessor assumes
that the law of its jurisdiction will govern the transaction. In In re
Eagle Enterprises, Inc. 3' a German lessor and a Pennsylvania
company entered into lease arrangements governed by German law
for equipment to be used in Pennsylvania.36 In the bankruptcy, the
lessor sought rejection of the leases and the return of its equipment,
as well as compensation for the use of the equipment during the
bankruptcy. 37 Under German law, the transaction would be respected
as a lease, but under Pennsylvania law, it would be an unperfected
security interest. 8  The court concluded that Penn-sylvania law
should govern the dispute, thereby relegating the lessor to the status
of an unsecured creditor.39
32. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 7, at 24-25.
33. See Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Video Update, Inc. (In re Video Update, Inc.), Nos. 00-
3663(JHW) to -3670(JHW), 00-3683(JHW), 2002 WL 1765618, at *4-*5 (D. Del. July 30, 2002)
(holding that a purported lease was a security interest where lessee bore risk of loss of property
and lessor did not customarily engage in the business of refurbishing and reselling leased
equipment, which evidenced intent not to return equipment to lessee).
34. 292 B.R. 313, 322 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2002) (citing In re Marhoefer Packing Co., 674
F.2d 1139, 1145 (7th. Cir. 1982)).
35. 223 B.R. 290 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1998).
36. Id. at 291-92.
37. Id. at 292.
38. Id. at 292-93.
39. Id. at 298-99.
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B. Structuring Transactions as Sales
Like leases, sale transactions may be structured for a variety of
purposes, but frequently transactions are structured as sales to
optimize the buyer's bankruptcy planning.4°  In a secured trans-
action, the financed collateral remains the property of the debtor's
estate in a bankruptcy proceeding.4' The secured creditor may have a
priority claim to those assets, but it is also subject to the procedural
restrictions of a bankruptcy.42 If, however, the assets are sold to a
third party, the sale proceeds become part of the bankruptcy estate.
Then, the buyer retains at least some ownership of the assets and can
use them without the necessity of obtaining court orders.43  For
example, a company can borrow against its accounts receivable and
give the lender a security interest. In the company's bankruptcy, the
lender may be delayed or prohibited from collecting the receiv-
ables.' If, however, the lender has purchased the receivables, it can
collect them directly from the account debtors without intervention.45
This type of financing structure is particularly useful for cash-
generating assets.
The parties to these transactions may be reluctant to contract out
of Article 9 entirely, because its priority scheme offers a back-up
position if the sale is recharacterized as a financing. In the 2001
revisions to Article 9, provisions were added that enable certain
types of sales transactions to benefit from the certainty and
predictability of Article 9 perfection and priority rules;46 sales of
payment intangibles and promissory notes were added to sales of
40. See, e.g., In re Keating, No. 05-CV-5921 (JS), 2006 WL 2690239, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Sept.
18, 2006) (finding that pre-bankruptcy planning by purchaser of an unqualified single premium
annuity was permissible where purchaser did not have actual intent to defraud creditors).
41. See United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 211 (1983).
42. See MaxI Sales Co. v. Critiques, Inc., 796 F.2d 1293, 1300 (10th Cir. 1986) (identifying
only four types of assets in which a secured party has a perfected security interest in insolvency
proceedings).
43. See In re LTV Steel Co., 274 B.R. 278, 285 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001).
44. See id. (denying emergency relief where further discovery and eviden-tiary hearing were
necessary to determine whether receivables remained prop-erty of debtor's estate).
45. If the secured party has become the absolute owner of the receivables and has no right of
recourse against the debtor, it is obligated to collect the receivables in a commercially reasonable
manner. U.C.C. § 9-607 cmt. 9 (2001). But cf Mauna Loa Vacation Ownership, L.P. v.
Accelerated Assets, L.L.C., No. CV030846PCTDGC, 2005 WL 2410676 at *3-*4 (D. Ariz. Sept.
28, 2005) (rejecting defendant's argument that the "commercially reasonable" standard applies
only where the transferor is completely excluded from collecting on the note).
46. U.C.C. § 9-109 cmt. 5 (2001).
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accounts and chattel paper as transactions subject to Article 9.47
Documents for these transactions routinely state that the intent of the
parties is for the transaction to be a true sale, but many parties
nonetheless include a perfected grant of security interest, just in case.
However, parties might desire, for particular business reasons, to
structure a sale transaction that falls completely outside the scope of
Article 9.
To structure out of Article 9 entirely, parties could structure a
transaction involving a sale of assets, other than those enumerated
types of asset sales that are specifically included in the scope of
Article 9. In contrast to the two-step test used to distinguish security
interests from true leases, no guidance is provided by either Article 9
or the definition of "security interest" in Article 1 for distinguishing
secured transactions from true sales.48 Rather, the question of what
constitutes a true sale has been left to other law.49 Like the
classification of true leases, the analysis should turn on the
fundamental economic characteristics of the transaction. Parties
seeking to structure true sales transactions should consider whether
the asset is truly sold, ultimately a question of whether the risks and
benefits of ownership are actually transferred from the purported
seller to the purported buyer." Unlike the case of security interests
versus true leases, however, the law has not developed reliable
objective factors that would enable parties to structure true sales
transactions with confidence." To distinguish between a true sale
and a security interest, courts have considered a number of factors,
including:
47. Id. § 9-109(a)(3).
48. U.C.C. § 1-201(35) (2001).
49. See U.C.C. § 9-109 cmts. 4-5 (2001) ("[N]either this Article nor the definition of
,security interest' in Section 1-201 provides rules for distinguishing sales transactions from those
that create a security interest securing an obligation."); id. § 9-318 cmt. 2 (same). See also
Netbank, FSB v. Kipperman (In re Commercial Money Ctr., Inc.), Nos. SC-05-1238-MOTB, 02-
09721-H7, 03-9033 1-H7, 2006 WL 2505205, at *10 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Aug. 25, 2006).
50. Compare Bear v. Cohen (In re Golden Plan of Cal., Inc.), 829 F.2d 705, 709-10 (9th Cir.
1986) (respecting as a sale a mortgage loan sale with no recourse to seller), with Fireman's Fund
Ins. Co. v. Grover (In re Woodson Co.), 813 F.2d 266, 271-72 (9th Cir. 1987) (recharacterizing
as a loan a mortgage loan sale where seller retained risk of loss).
51. See Robert D. Aicher & William J. Fellerhoff, Characterization of a Transfer of
Receivables As a Sale or a Secured Loan Upon Bankruptcy of the Transferor, 65 Am. Bankr. L.J.
181, 206 (1991) (stating that there exists no "discernible rule of law or analytical approach");
Thomas E. Plank, The True Sale of Loans and the Role of Recourse, 14 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 287,
290 (1991) ("[C]ourts do not rely upon any universally accepted set of factors ...
Fall 2006]
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1. Recourse. Although many courts have held that recourse
alone is not sufficient to recharacterize a loan as a financing, it has
often been cited as a factor. 3 Where the buyer can collect from the
seller if the purchased assets fail to perform, the seller has retained
the risk of ownership of the asset. 4 The extent of the recourse is
important,55 as is the issue of whether the sale documents only
provide recourse, or also provide reserves, indemnities or other
protections for the seller against non-collection of the assets. 6 The
buyer is typically permitted to resort to the seller if the seller
breaches its own representations and warranties as to the assets.
Warranties that the assets will perform, however, or guarantees of
collectibility, are indicia of disguised financings. 7 It should not
matter whether the recourse is an immediately available remedy or is
activated by a condition or event, if the package of rights the buyer
retains against the seller means that the buyer bears no risk of loss on
the assets.
2. Substitution of Assets. Requiring or permitting the seller to
substitute assets for the assets previously sold suggests that the buyer
is still responsible for the sold assets, and may be a risky strategy for
the parties who intend the transaction to be respected as a sale. 8
3. Discount Rates and Interest Rates. A number of courts have
construed pricing terms that seem to compensate the buyer in a
manner typical for lenders rather than buyers as indicia of a
disguised financing. 9 In these cases, courts have analogized dis-
52. See, e.g., Major's Furniture Mart, Inc. v. Castle Credit Corp., 602 F.2d 538, 544 (3d Cir.
1979) (stating that the presence of recourse does not convert a sale into a security interest).
53. See, e.g., id. at 545 (stating that recourse is an "extremely relevant factor"); In re
Carolina Utils. Supply Co., 118 B.R. 412, 416 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1990); Carter v. Four Seasons
Funding Corp., 97 S.W.3d 387, 398 (Ark. 2003).
54. Netbank, FSB v. Kipperman (In re Commercial Money Ctr., Inc.), No. SC-05-1238-
MOTB, 2006 WL 2505205, at * 15 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Aug. 25, 2006) (recharacterizing transaction
as a loan where a buyer had none of the potential benefits of ownership and had not been
allocated any risk of loss and the buyer had no possibility of receiving repayment of the
"principal" and "interest").
55. Full recourse can lead to recharacterization. See, e.g., Ratto v. Sims (In re Lendvest
Mortgage, Inc.), 119 B.R. 199, 201 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1990).
56. See, e.g., In re Coronet Capital Co., 142 B.R. 78, 81 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992)
("Participation Agreements where the lead lender guarantees a return to the participant have been
found to be disguised loans.").
57. See Major's Furniture Mart, 602 F.2d at 545-46.
58. See, e.g., Ables v. Major Funding Corp. (In re Major Funding Corp.), 82 B.R. 443, 449
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1987).
59. See Liona Corp. v. PCH Assocs. (In re PCH Assocs.) (PCH I1), 949 F.2d 585, 600-02
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count on sale to interest on a loan.6°
4. Notice and Control. If there is an account debtor or other
person obligated on the assets, and that obligated person is not
notified of the sale, or the seller continues to hold and service the
assets or use the assets in its business, the question arises whether the
seller or buyer owns the assets.6'
5. Return of Surplus. The buyer should not only bear the risk of
loss, but also enjoy the benefits of ownership. True sale status may
be undermined when the buyer is contractually required to turn over
to the seller any surplus of collections on the sold assets over
purchase price, whether by direct return, offset to purchase price on
next sale date, automatic dividends or distributions made without
director or manager action, or fees not reasonably related to services
rendered.62
The foregoing list is not intended to be exhaustive, but merely
indicative of the economic factors some courts have considered when
distinguishing between a true sale and a security interest. Some
courts may still focus the analysis on the intent of the parties.
63
Under these circumstances, it is difficult to identify a consistent
theme in the case law surrounding the factors courts should consider
when distinguishing true sales from security interests. 64 Accordingly,
parties wishing to contract out of Article 9 and into sale transactions
should consider the ramifications of recharacterization under certain
standards.
III. CONTRACTING OUT OF SPECIFIC DUTIES
If contracting out of Article 9 entirely is fraught with risk, can
the parties contract out of, waive or modify the more onerous duties?
In transactions that fall within the scope of Article 9, the primary
(2d Cir. 1991); Cohen v. Army Moral Support Fund (In re Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset
Mgmt. Corp.), 67 B.R. 557, 587-89 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986), aff'd, Bevill, Bresler & Schulman
Asset Mgmt. Corp. v. Spencer Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 878 F.2d 742, 745 (3d Cir. 1989).
60. Cohen, 67 B.R. at 587-88.
61. See CC Fin., Inc. v. Ross, 301 S.E.2d 262 (Ga. 1983).
62. See Major's Furniture Mart, Inc. v. Castle Credit Corp., 602 F.2d 538, 542-43 (3d Cir.
1979).
63. See, e.g., Orix Credit Alliance, Inc. v. Pappas, No. 89 C 6679, 1990 WL 129365, at *4
(N.D. 111. Aug. 29, 1990); In re Commercial Loan Corp., 316 B.R. 690, 700 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
2004).
64. In re Commercial Loan, 316 B.R. at 700.
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provisions that impose duties on secured parties for protection of
debtors generally may not be waived or varied by agreement.65
However, Article 9 "does not restrict the ability of parties to agree to
settle, compromise, or renounce claims for past conduct that may
have constituted a violation or breach of those rights and duties."66
A. Non-Waivable Rights
U.C.C. section 9-602 sets forth the unwaivable rights of
debtors.67 "If the parties sign a security agreement containing
prohibited waivers, and then seek to enforce them, courts most often
remedy violations of Section 9-602 by simply reading the relevant
65. U.C.C. § 9-602 (2001).
66. Id. § 9-602 cmt. 3.
67. Section 9-602 provides:
Except as otherwise provided in Section 9-624, to the extent that they give rights to a
debtor or obligor and impose duties on a secured party, the debtor or obligor may not
waive or vary the rules stated in the following listed sections:
(1) Section 9-207(b)(4)(C), which deals with use and operation of the collateral by
the secured party;
(2) Section 9-210, which deals with requests for an accounting and requests
concerning a list of collateral and statement of account;
(3) Section 9-607(c), which deals with collection and enforcement of collateral;
(4) Sections 9-608(a) and 9-615(c) to the extent that they deal with application or
payment of noncash proceeds of collection, enforcement, or disposition;
(5) Sections 9-608(a) and 9-615(d) to the extent that they require accounting for or
payment of surplus proceeds of collateral;
(6) Section 9-609 to the extent that it imposes upon a secured party that takes
possession of collateral without judicial process the duty to do so without breach
of the peace;
(7) Sections 9-610(b), 9-611, 9-613, and 9-614, which deal with disposition of
collateral;
(8) Section 9-615(f), which deals with calculation of a deficiency or surplus when a
disposition is made to the secured party, a person related to the secured party, or a
secondary obligor;
(9) Section 9-616, which deals with explanation of the calculation of a surplus or
deficiency;
(10) Sections 9-620, 9-621, and 9-622, which deal with acceptance of collateral in
satisfaction of obligation;
(11) Section 9-623, which deals with redemption of collateral;
(12) Section 9-624, which deals with permissible waivers; and
(13) Sections 9-625 and 9-626, which deal with the secured party's liability for
failure to comply with this article.
Id. § 9-602.
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documents as if the offending clause had never been included."68
Although parties are unlikely to be successful in waiving the rights
of the debtor or obligor and the duties of a secured party,69 the parties
may agree on standards to satisfy those rights, except breaching the
peace, if the agreed standards are not manifestly unreasonable.7"
In a ruling on a motion for a new trial, the court in Still v.
Regulus Group LLC 7 perhaps set the outer limit for defining
manifest unreasonableness. Still had agreed to a formula for valuing
shares he had posted as collateral.72 The court rejected Still's claim
that "no reasonable jury could conclude that the formula was not
'manifestly unreasonable,"' where the formula could result in a
negative $257 million valuation for the shares.73 Other cases have
applied the "manifestly unreasonable" test to a variety of standard-
setting agreements, including an agreement that established standards
for a foreclosure sale,7" and an agreement that did not require the
broker-dealer to segregate cash collateral in its possession.75
B. Post-Default Agreements
In addition to non-waivable rights, Article 9 provides debtors
with certain rights that may be waived only by "an agreement to that
effect entered into and authenticated after default" :76 (1) the right to
notification prior to disposition of collateral,77 (2) the right to
mandatory disposition of consumer goods7" and (3) the right to
redeem collateral on tendering fulfillment of all of the obligations
secured by the collateral and related expenses.79
68. In re Schwalb, 347 B.R. 726, 748 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2006).
69. See id.
70. U.C.C. § 9-603 (2001).
71. No. CIV.A. 00-603, 2003 WL 22249198 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 1, 2003).
72. Id. at*10-*11.
73. Id.
74. Fin. Fed. Credit Inc. v. Boss Transp., Inc., No. 7:05-CV44HL, 2006 WL 901722, at *6
(M.D. Ga. Apr. 6, 2006).
75. In re MJK Clearing, Inc., No. 01-4257 RJK, 2003 WL 1824937, at *9 (D. Minn. Apr. 7,
2003).
76. U.C.C. § 9-624 (2001).
77. Id. § 9-611(b).
78. Id. § 9-620(e).
79. Id. § 9-623(b).
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IV. EMERGING TRENDS IN
CONTRACTING OUT BY MORPHNG COLLATERAL
The perfection and priority rules in Part 3 of Article 9 turn upon
the type of property serving as collateral. For example, a secured
party can perfect a security interest in tangible chattel paper by filing
a financing statement" or by taking possession of the collateral,8 but
can only perfect a security interest in a deposit account by obtaining
control of the collateral.82
But is the categorization of collateral absolute, or can collateral
metamorphose? Categorization of types of collateral varies with the
use the debtor makes of the property. The classic example is a
tangible item, such as a telephone, which is always "goods"8 3 (and
very likely has embedded "software"84), but is also "inventory"85
while it is held for sale or lease, and may become "equipment"86 if it
is purchased for use in a business, or "consumer goods"87 if
purchased for personal or family use. Can the parties to a contract
vary the categorization of collateral, and contract out of a particular
perfection and priority methodology?
Consider a "payment intangible," which is a "general intangible
under which the account debtor's principal obligation is a monetary
obligation."88 These uncluttered payment rights generally arise when
rights to payment are separated from a bundle of other contract
rights.89 For instance, if a bank makes a loan and does not require the
borrower to sign a promissory note as tangible evidence of the debt,
its right to repayment is a payment intangible. The bank may
participate out its interest in the loan by selling rights to payment to
another bank, which does not become a party to the loan contract
with the borrower or acquire other rights, other than the right to
receive its ratable share of the borrower's payments.9" Those
80. Id. § 9-312(a).
81. Id. § 9-313(a).
82. Id. § 9-312(b)(1).
83. Id. § 9-102(a)(44).
84. Id.
85. Id. § 9-102(a)(48)(B).
86. Id. § 9-102(a)(33).
87. Id. § 9-102(a)(23).
88. Id. § 9-102(a)(61).
89. Id. § 9-102 cmt. 5(d).
90. See id.
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payment rights are also general intangibles, although their
characteristics are different from those of the seller bank's payment
intangible.'
Sales of payment intangibles enjoy Article 9's lowest-
maintenance perfection requirements because they are automatically
perfected.92 If, however, the original payment right is not a payment
intangible, like the first bank's loan, but a right to receive a royalty
payment for a copyright license, the royalty is an account.9 3 Security
interests in accounts must be perfected by filing appropriate
financing statements.94 The licensor may wish to monetize that
royalty without the necessity of ensuring that the financing statement
information is correct, filing the financing statements and remem-
bering to continue them before they expire.
If the licensor who receives that royalty sells the right to
payment to a third party without transferring any rights in the
underlying license, does the sold payment stream remain a royalty,
and thus an account, or does it become only a naked right to receive
payment, and thus a payment intangible?95 Does the asset always
carry the characteristics of its origin, or can it be refashioned into a
different asset type?
Until quite recently, this question remained much discussed but
unanswered, suggesting that parties relying on automatic perfection
in such situations were at risk. Some illumination, however, has
been provided by the recent decision in Netbank, FSB v. Kipperman
(In re Commercial Money Center, Inc.)96 The case involved payment
streams derived not from license royalties, but from chattel paper.97
The court defined chattel paper as "a record or records that evidence
both a monetary obligation and a security interest in or a lease of
91. Id.
92. Id. § 9-309(3).
93. An "account" is "a right to payment of a monetary obligation, whether or not earned by
performance." Id. § 9-102(a)(2).
94. Id. § 9-310(a).
95. Note that the definition of "general intangible" in U.C.C. section 9-102(a)(42) excludes
"accounts," but does not exclude rights to payment under accounts, while the definition of
"accounts" in U.C.C. section 9-102(a)(2) excludes rights to payment arising under chattel paper,
instruments, payment for money, and funds advanced or sold. Id. § 9-102(a)(2), (a)(42).
96. Nos. SC-05-1238-MOTB, 02-09721-H7, 03-90331-H7, 2006 WL 2505
205 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Aug. 25, 2006).
97. Id. at *5.
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specific goods."98 Based on this definition, the court concluded that
a severed payment stream was not chattel paper, because it was
neither a record nor evidence of a monetary obligation and a security
interest, but was itself a monetary obligation.99
Since "royalty" is not a term defined in the U.C.C., it is not as
clear that a payment stream separated from a royalty would not still
be considered a royalty. This is a developing area of law; parties
therefore should not rely on automatic perfection for similar
transactions, particularly because the automatic perfection rule
applies only to sales of general intangibles, not security interests in
general intangibles."0 In the Netbank case, although the court found
that the separated payment stream was a payment intangible, the
transaction was determined to be a financing, not a sale, and thus did
not qualify for automatic perfection.' 1
V. CONCLUSION
In structuring transactions that may challenge the applicability
of Article 9 and its priority system, parties should focus on the
economic realities of their business deals. If a purported sale or lease
bears too many attributes of a secured financing, it runs the risk of
being recharacterized as the latter. If non-Article 9 treatment is of
paramount importance for tax, bankruptcy planning or other business
considerations, the parties may have to accept transactional terms
that do not stress-test the analysis. Disclosure is another critical
consideration. To the extent that transactions are structured in a way
that takes liabilities off the balance sheet, for example, parties should
ensure that the liabilities are fully and clearly disclosed in footnotes
or otherwise to avoid misleading investors and other interested
parties. 102 Within the parameters of careful structuring and disclo-
sure, however, Article 9 proves to be a flexible and responsive
system of rules that facilitates commercial creativity.
98. Id. at *7 (quoting NEV. REV. STAT. § 104.9102(1)(k) (2005)).
99. Id.
100. U.C.C. § 9-309 (2001). See also Houston v. Eiler (In re Cohen), 305 B.R. 886, 904
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2004).
101. Netbank, 2006 WL 2505205, at *15, *17.
102. See CSX Transp., Inc. v. Bd. of Equalization, No. 1:02-CV-2634-CAP, 2005 WL
4694636, at *17 n. 18 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 29, 2005) (referring to the recent Enron scandal and noting
that one way "Enron was able to deceive investors as to its value was by engaging in extensive
off-balance sheet financing transactions").
